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THE VEXING PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY IN 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A PROPOSAL 
 
FERNANDO R. TESÓN∗ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As is well known, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
raises a host of thorny issues: the threshold for intervention, the question 
of proportionality, the problem of last resort, the dilemma of whether or 
not to codify standards and procedures, and so forth.  In this paper I will 
not address those issues; crucial and controversial as they are;1 I will 
assume that they have been somehow settled.  I will also assume that it is 
desirable to find alternatives to unilateral intervention.  The question, 
then, becomes this: who should authorize humanitarian intervention?  
Any acceptable authorizing procedure must avoid over-intervention and 
abuse on the one hand, and under-intervention and inertia on the other.  
That is a daunting challenge in institutional design.  Recent experiences 
show that both dangers are real, and, alas, the victims of such failures 
will be flesh and blood human beings, often the most vulnerable. 
Before even starting to suggest an appropriate international 
procedure for humanitarian intervention, we must clarify what goals or 
values those institutions should serve.  There are many possible answers 
to this: national interest (that is, for each citizen, the interest of his or her 
country); individual freedom; the rule of law; etc.  I here suggest that the 
institutions for humanitarian intervention should serve the cosmopolitan 
interest of humanity, as opposed to the national interests of states and 
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governments.2  Here I leave undefined the full content of this interest, 
because for purposes of intervention it is fairly clear and minimal: to 
save persons from tyranny and anarchy, from the most brutal forms of 
oppression.  (Notice that I talk about the cosmopolitan interest of 
humanity and not the interests of the international community, which can 
be easily interpreted as the interests of all the governments of the world, 
not of the people, and especially not those who are oppressed and 
victimized.) 
Here I will discuss two alternatives that are on the table, as it 
were.  The first is to make the United Nations Security Council, perhaps 
reformed in some way, the only body empowered to authorize 
humanitarian intervention.  This is the option favored by a great majority 
of governments and scholars as well as by the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).3  In this view, the only 
acceptable procedure for humanitarian intervention is to obtain the 
authorization of the Security Council.  Given the provisions of the UN 
Charter, such authorization is deemed to come from the international 
community: Article 24(1) expressly acknowledges such delegation of 
power.4  Under this conception of legitimate international authority, 
neither a regional organization, such as the Organization of American 
States, nor a military alliance, such as NATO, can authorize 
humanitarian intervention.  And, of course, unilateral intervention is 
unlawful since it is not a defensive use of force—the only unilateral 
military action deemed lawful, it is thought, under the charter.5 
The second option, suggested by Allen Buchanan and Robert 
Keohane and endorsed by some (including myself), is to create a council 
of democratic states with good human rights records and traditions as the 
appropriate body to authorize intervention.6  This proposal includes an 
array of safeguards to prevent abuse and deception from would-be 
interveners as well as to reduce information costs regarding the gravity 
of the situation and other factual matters. 
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I will argue here (contrary to what I earlier thought) that none of 
those alternatives is satisfactory.  The Security Council is dysfunctional 
with respect to humanitarian intervention—dysfunctional for the purpose 
of protecting human freedom.  A council of democratic states, while at 
first blush a better alternative, is also undesirable, and, paradoxically, it 
may be worse than what we presently have.  I will propose here, as an 
ideal solution, a new body, the Court of Human Security.  Composed of 
life-tenured independent judges, this body would be entitled to oversee 
not only humanitarian interventions, but also the whole range of 
responses, forcible and non-forcible, to humanitarian crises. 
 
I. IS THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE BEST SOURCE OF AUTHORITY? 
A. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 1990S 
It is quite common these days to hear wistful evocations of the 
1990s, a time of optimism after the fall of the Soviet Union when the 
United States presided over an explosion of global prosperity and 
freedom, a time of economic and political globalization where, most of 
the time, international interactions really appeared, perhaps for the first 
time in a long time, as positive-sum games.  There was a general sense 
then that the stark logic of the Cold War had given way to endless 
possibilities of cooperative behavior for the spread of respect for human 
rights and democratic rule and the expansion of free markets and 
consequent prosperity.7 
An important feature of this era was, of course, the renewed 
Security Council.  As is known, the Security Council authorized the use 
of force to address humanitarian crises on various occasions.  This led a 
number of observers, myself included, to express optimism about the use 
of the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, as an 
instrument for the advancement of human dignity and freedom in the 
world.8  There was a growing sense that the international community 
agreed on the values that it should uphold and that there was an effective 
mechanism to promote those values, if necessary, by force.  Only rogue 
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states and other recalcitrant dictators remained at the margins.  There was 
a lessened sense of threat and a reinforced belief in the international 
community not just as a community of minimal interest but as a 
community of values. 
For many, these hopes were shattered by the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, and by the sequel in Iraq and elsewhere.  The 
generalized sense was that the world had returned, with new actors and 
new threats, to the zero-sum logic of the Cold War.  The radical revolt 
against freedom and reason mounted by terrorism could not be 
confronted with the tools that had developed during the previous decade. 
I share this sentiment to an important degree.  However, looking 
back, I have concluded that, with respect to humanitarian intervention, 
we have unduly romanticized the 1990s.  (No doubt some people over-
praise the 1990s for partisan reasons, but I’ll ignore that complication 
here.)  To be sure, the experience of the nineties was preferable to the 
deadlock of the Cold War.  Most importantly, the Security Council’s 
practice laid to rest the doubts that many had about its legal power to 
authorize humanitarian intervention under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.  Yet, a dispassionate assessment of the practice of the Security 
Council during that period discloses a number of serious dysfunctions 
and problems. 
To begin with, some of those authorized interventions were 
unsuccessful.  I am thinking primarily of the actions in Somalia and 
Rwanda.  There were no doubt several reasons for this, but I think that 
one important reason was the inability of the Security Council to follow 
up, to monitor whether the action by the intervener was apt to achieve the 
humanitarian objective.  And, in turn, this was caused by the impotence 
of the Security Council to curb the intrusion of national interest into the 
cosmopolitan humanitarian objective.  There was also the question of 
dwindling domestic support (in the United States with regard to Somalia, 
for example), but that, in turn, can be linked to the tenuous standing of 
the authorizing body itself in the eyes of the public.  The French 
intervention in Rwanda was even more dramatically unsuccessful as it 
led to the worst modern case of failure to intervene to prevent genocide 
in that country. 
In addition, some of the (arguably) successful interventions 
suffered from substantive and procedural problems.  The intervention in 
Haiti, for example, was directed not to prevent or stop massive loss of 
life but to reverse an unconstitutional transfer of power.  My point is not 
that pro-democratic intervention is wrong; on the contrary, (as I’ve 
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argued elsewhere) I support pro-democratic intervention in Haiti-like 
cases.  Rather, my point is that those who support the exclusivity of the 
Security Council’s power to authorize intervention have an unresolved 
problem.  They argue simultaneously that (1) the Security Council has 
quasi-absolute discretion in authorizing the use of force; and (2) the 
threshold for humanitarian intervention should be set very high, say, at 
massive loss of life, genocide, and the like.  This view is inconsistent 
because the Security Council can authorize the use of force in situations 
that do not meet that standard, as it did in Haiti.  Supporters of the 
Security Council as the authorizing body have not resolved this problem.  
I myself do not offer here a general answer but simply flag the issue.  In 
Sierra Leone in 1997, the Security Council issued a retroactive 
authorization in apparent disregard of the common wisdom that 
authorization to use force should take place before the operation.  Again, 
I express no view on this here except to say that the 1990s practice, 
which is sometimes praised without reservations, suffered from these 
substantive and procedural irregularities under the very theory 
presupposed by those who praised that practice. 
And even the two authorized interventions that were reasonably 
successful, the use of force to protect the Kurds in Iraq in 1991 and 
NATO’s bombing of Bosnia in 1994, did not address the root of the 
problem in any lasting way, as we now sadly know.  Ironically, the most 
successful intervention of the 1990s was unauthorized—NATO’s air 
campaign in Kosovo in 1998. 
 
B. GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
So, the 1990s practice yields, I think, mixed results and does not 
necessarily support the view that the Security Council is, ideally, the 
institution best equipped to enforce the interests of humanity as a whole.  
In addition to the lessons drawn from this practice (and maybe as 
evidenced by it), there are serious general problems with the Security 
Council that make it dysfunctional for humanitarian intervention. 
1. Incentives 
I have suggested that the interest in ending or preventing 
humanitarian crises is a cosmopolitan humanitarian interest, an interest 
that springs, as it were, from universal moral concerns that affect, and 
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reside in, humanity.  States, on the other hand, have national interests, 
and international organizations are the fora where those interests clash or 
converge and are therefore hardly a depository of cosmopolitan 
humanitarian values.  The Security Council is no exception. 
2. Inertia 
The second problem with the Security Council, noted by many, 
is the danger of inertia, which leads, of course, to under-intervention.  
This was the case in Rwanda in 1994 and is the case today in Darfur, and 
there are other examples.  (I would include Iraq but don’t want to open 
that front in the debate,9 as it is not necessary for my argument here.)  
The veto rules, by their very nature, are biased toward inaction.  But even 
without taking the veto into account, any resolution needs nine votes. 
Even in the 1990s, action by the Security Council was only 
possible because the United States was able to threaten or bribe council 
members (permanent and non-permanent) into acquiescence or support.  
That the available procedure to end massacres depends on one member 
being able to bribe or threaten others in order to get their votes to stop 
the massacres does not seem to be a very solid basis for any institutional 
framework.  (Luckily, that hegemonic member is the United States, 
which, for all its failures, is sympathetic to freedom.  Imagine what 
would happen if the hegemon were an “evil empire” inimical to human 
rights.)  In short, the whole process seems removed from a cosmopolitan 
concern for humanity. 
3. Arbitrariness of Veto Power 
The third problem is the moral arbitrariness of the veto power.  
Being a permanent member is an accident of history, and while some of 
the permanent members, because of their decent human rights records, 
may be better guardians of human freedom, others are not.  And at any 
rate, it is not clear why even the decent permanent members of the 
Security Council should have more of a say on humanitarian matters than 
non-permanent members with equal or better human rights records.  Of 
course, there is the problem of internalization of costs: it may be argued 
that states like the United States that will bear the brunt of intervention 
should have a veto on these matters.  It is easy for Finland or Belgium to 
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send Americans to fight.  However, this view overlooks that we are 
talking about permission to use force, not obligation to do so, at least in 
the current state of world organization; therefore absence of veto power 
does not mean that unwilling states would have to intervene. 
4. Moral Legitimacy Deficit 
The fourth problem is what I will call the Security Council’s 
deficit in moral legitimacy.  By this I do not mean what some authors 
have decried as the lack of geographical representation (lack of diversity, 
as it were) in the Security Council.  On the contrary, with regard to 
humanitarian intervention, the fact that the Security Council is dominated 
by the West is one of its good features because (as much as political 
correctness seems to inhibit people from saying this) Western powers 
tend to be friendlier to human rights and democracy than others.  What I 
mean is that voting and veto rights in the council are given to regimes 
that are tyrannical or otherwise unrepresentative.  As is well known, no 
human rights credentials are required to serve on the Security Council.  
One of its permanent members, China, is a notorious human rights 
violator; another one, Russia, has serious deficiencies in that area.  In 
addition, various tyrannical regimes at various times have served as non-
permanent members.  The problem here is twofold: first, governments 
that are human rights-unfriendly should not have the power to authorize 
or to veto prospective interventions.  Second, undemocratic regimes do 
not represent their peoples, and therefore, on any plausible theory of 
agency or representation, their vote is morally blighted. 
In the light of these deficiencies, the insistence that all 
humanitarian interventions should be approved by the Security Council 
reveals, I think, the lawyer’s misplaced faith on process.  Lawyers like 
process, any process.  Maintaining the forms of law is to them important; 
so if there is in place an international decision-making procedure that 
involves voting, for example, then only this process will yield legitimate 
decisions.  But the moral currency of any process is surely parasitic on 
the credentials of those who participate in it.  To give a grotesque 
example, there is no value in the decision-making process that took 
place, say, within the Taliban’s inner “cabinet.”  A decision by the 
Taliban leadership to stone women alive for adultery is not legitimized 
by members of the government voting to that effect any more than 
procedurally regular voting by the Mafia’s governing council legitimizes 
the decision to perpetrate criminal acts.  Procedures in the United 
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Nations organs, such as the Security Council, give the illusion of 
democratic legitimacy because, after all, governments are voting, and 
there are procedures in place to adopt decisions.  It looks like a 
democratic legislature, but it takes little reflection to see that United 
Nations procedures are very distant from democratic procedures. 
Democratic majority rule as a basis for collective decisions is 
engrafted in an individualistic political theory, in a constitution, that 
limits government and secures freedom or similar values.  Because the 
international system does not secure individual freedom from rulers, the 
voting procedures have no moral currency.  They represent, at best, 
procedures to secure a modus vivendi among rulers, but they are in no 
sense democratic, as that word is understood in political theory.  Because 
of this deficit, the decisions to assist victims of grievous injustice should 
not depend on the acquiescence of rulers who at the very least do not 
represent their people and at the very worst are tyrants themselves. 
 
II. IS A COUNCIL OF DEMOCRATIC STATES A BETTER ALTERNATIVE? 
In an important article, Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane 
have proposed a complex system to oversee the use of force.10  While 
their article deals with preventive war, they expressly suggest that the 
proposal can be extended to cover authorization for humanitarian 
interventions.  They propose a system of sanctions designed to prevent 
abuses and misinformation on the part of prospective interveners.  A 
central part of their proposal is to create a council of democratic states as 
an authorizing body should the Security Council be paralyzed by veto.  
This proposal appears as an improvement over the present system, given 
the aforementioned criticism of the Security Council, because if 
members are really democratic and really concerned with the 
cosmopolitan interest of humanity, the chances of effective and fair-
minded decisions are significantly increased. 
I am very sympathetic with this proposal, as shown by the fact 
that, until today, I had supported it.  It fits nicely with my own Kantian 
normative view of international relations, where the hope for freedom 
and peace rests with an alliance of liberal states.11  However, I have to 
concede, reluctantly, that these hopes are unrealistic and that this 
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proposal cannot possibly work for a number of reasons related to the 
distortion of the meaning of human rights and the rhetorical use of 
human rights language to mask self-interest or hostility to individual 
freedom or free markets or both.  This problem is endemic to the United 
Nations human rights machinery and to human rights scholarship, and, 
alas, it sometimes infects human rights NGOs themselves. 
The problem is illustrated by the recent creation of a new United 
Nations organ, the Human Rights Council (HRC).  The HRC was 
supposed to replace the largely ineffective and politicized Human Rights 
Commission.  A crucial issue, of course, is who would serve.  Is any 
government, regardless of their human rights record, eligible to serve?  
As is known, Western powers failed to establish a voting system and 
criteria for membership aimed at excluding tyrants from the HRC.12  As 
the rules stand now, tyrants will be elected to the HRC.  (It is a sad 
comment on the human rights commitment by the so-called international 
community that the United States and a few others were the only ones to 
vote against this masquerade.)  Buchanan and Keohane could retort that 
this flawed HRC is not what they had in mind and that an appropriate 
“pure” council of democratic states could get the job done.  This reply, 
however, is insufficient, for at least two reasons. 
First, many governments (supported here, sadly, by many 
academics) manipulate the concept of human rights in various ways in 
order to dilute worries about tyranny and oppression and make tyrants 
more respectable.  One way in which this is done, especially within the 
United Nations human rights system, is by advancing the thesis of 
equivalence of civil/political rights and socio/economic rights.13  This 
deplorable doctrine allows brutal regimes that somehow can show 
economic improvement in some area to say that they are as good, or as 
bad, as those states that guarantee liberal freedoms and the rule of law.  
So, on this view, Cuba is no worse than Norway. 
The other strategy to dilute human rights criticism is to 
exaggerate the gravity of violations by states that traditionally respect 
human rights.  Thus, the fact that the United States resorted to illegal 
methods of interrogation or that it established military commissions is 
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regarded by critics of the West as a crime as serious as, say, the mass 
starvation and total suppression of civil liberties caused by the brutal 
North Korean regime.  And a host of other regimes get off the hook as a 
result of this piece of propaganda: all the Muslim countries, including 
Iran, are able to say, with a straight face, that next to the United States 
they look pretty good.  Of course, this is not new: during the Cold War, 
many people (and sadly, many academics) thought that, say, the pathetic 
attempt of Senator McCarthy to undermine freedom in the United States 
was morally equivalent to the thirty million people slaughtered by Stalin 
and the Soviet Gulags.  So it is virtually impossible to get the United 
Nations to create a body with the characteristics that Buchanan and 
Keohane propose simply because anti-Western sentiment in the United 
Nations has succeeded in disfiguring the notion of human rights beyond 
all recognition. 
I should pause here to say that, properly understood, civil and 
political rights are not, perhaps, the only moral-political values that 
matter.  I believe that governments have an obligation to try to alleviate 
world poverty.  I also believe that an important first step to achieve this 
is to promote open trade and freer immigration (but I cannot pursue the 
issue here14).  However, from a philosophical standpoint, securing 
freedom (civil and political rights) has lexical priority over economic 
policy (for a number of reasons I cannot go into here), and, importantly, 
civil and political rights are the ones that are at the center of the 
humanitarian intervention doctrine (although I would include extreme 
deprivation as a possible rationale as well). 
Second, as I pointed out above, the incentives that governments 
have are dysfunctional with respect to humanitarian intervention.  The 
crucial failure here is caused by the logic of empire.  More often than 
not, the United Nations has become a forum where many countries, 
including European countries, band together to frustrate the preferences 
of the United States, the world’s only superpower.  Advocating more 
power for the United Nations has become synonymous with curbing the 
power of the United States.  Maybe this is a good thing, maybe not.  I 
would say that it is a good thing if the United States wants to do 
something bad, and it is a bad thing if the United States wants to do 
something good.  I am one of those who still believe that the United 
States is a force for good in the world (a dwindling crowd, it seems).  But 
be that as it may, countries in the “democratic council” animated with a 
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desire to collectively contain United States power can hardly be expected 
to care about the cosmopolitan interest of humanity.  If it is more 
important to contain imperialism than to free Iraq from the brutal rule of 
Saddam Hussein, then millions of persons will continue to suffer. 
The experience of the establishment of the Human Rights 
Council shows this very clearly.  The coalition of fifty-six Islamic states, 
of which only two (Turkey and Iraq) are democratic, can block the 
United States (or Denmark, for example, on account of having allowed 
the newspaper cartoons) from being elected to the Council.  Again, it is 
hard to believe that, given current animosities between various groups of 
states and, in particular, animosity against the United States, those whose 
task should be to aid helpless victims of tyranny and anarchy will really 
be effective in doing so. 
 
III. A TENTATIVE PROPOSAL: THE COURT OF HUMAN SECURITY 
To alleviate these problems, I propose to create a new 
international court, the Court of Human Security (CHS).  The CHS 
would not be composed of governments or government representatives 
but of judges of undisputed integrity who are demonstrably 
knowledgeable about human rights, human freedom, and human security 
and demonstrably committed to the respect of human rights and genuine 
democracy. 
I will not offer many specifics except to say that the selection 
and tenure of the judges should make them as independent as possible 
from governments.  This requirement is crucial.  The selection procedure 
must improve upon the one that governs the election of the magistrates of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  The ICJ is, I am sad to say, not 
entirely above suspicion in terms of impartiality, as shown by the recent 
advisory opinion on the wall that Israel is building on the occupied 
territories.15  Perhaps one way to do this is to grant judges life tenure, as 
U.S. federal judges have (the ICJ judges are elected for nine-year 
periods).  But that alone will not be enough.  Persons who were 
government officials (other than judges) or politicians should not be 
eligible.  Again, the main requirement is knowledge about, and 
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commitment to, individual freedom and democracy.  The selection 
procedure should minimize the role of governments and expand the role 
of demonstrably non-partisan NGOs and other disinterested civil groups 
(not lobbyists or other political operatives). 
The CHS would hear the evidence ex ante for any proposed 
intervention and would grant or refuse “warrants” to intervene, along the 
lines suggested by Buchanan and Keohane.  This, of course, will not stop 
a powerful state, but it would significantly raise the costs of going ahead.  
One can even imagine, as these authors do, a system of sanctions for 
cases in which the applicant misrepresents the evidence.  The CHS, 
however, would not be able to mandate intervention since military action 
is always permissible, not obligatory.  It is a function of the resources of 
the state, and I cannot see how it can be made legally mandatory.  The 
typical case, then, would be a state or coalition that contemplates 
intervention.  The CHS would then hear the applicant in court, and, 
within a reasonable time dictated by urgency, it would authorize or 
refuse the intervention. 
One of the obvious criticisms of this idea is that it is utopian.  
But I do not see why it is more or less utopian than the ICJ was when it 
was first proposed in the early twentieth century or than the International 
Criminal Court or than all the various other courts that we have dealing 
with crimes of war and crimes against humanity.  Only a short while ago 
it was unthinkable that the world could make dictators accountable for 
their atrocities.  In fact, this idea seems to me a priori more utopian than 
the idea of an independent court authorizing humanitarian intervention. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
My conclusion is grim.  In the present circumstances, no state or 
group of states can serve as an acceptable authorizing body.  
Governments are caught in the logic of empire: the world’s superpower 
wants to get its way, and the rest of the world uses international 
organizations like the UN as a means to curb the superpower’s will.  The 
United States, sensing this, resorts to unilateral behavior.  Neither one 
nor the other, caught in this gigantic prisoner’s dilemma, will be in a 
position to advance the cosmopolitan interest of humanity. 
 
 
